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Rarely have notable workers in philosophy and in literary theory 
interacted so intensely as in the period of German letters that spanned 
the end of the eighteenth and the beginning of the nineteenth century. 
The case of Johann Fichte and Friedrich Schelling is especially 
interesting, since each of them imagined they were working to solidify 
a common position that was the systematic fruit of all of Kant’s labors 
on transcendental idealism, and yet they struggled, in almost Oedipal 
fashion, for leadership of the movement. One can look to the 
Fichte-Schelling Correspondence for the personal details of the fraught 
relationship, but to answer the serious philosophical question of the 
“one difference” that separates the two thinkers, one had best look to 
the texts the two thinkers published or penned in the years 1800–02: 
Fichte’s Vocation of Man along with new versions of the 
Wissenschaftslehre attempted in 1800 and 1801–02 and Schelling’s  
System of Transcendental Idealism along with two pieces published in 
his Zeitschrift für speculative Physik, the General Deduction of the  
Dynamic Process and the Presentation of My System. This chapter will 
focus on the System of Transcendental Idealism1 and the Vocation of 
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Man,2 with occasional reference to the points of conflict that emerge 
between the two thinkers in the Correspondence.3 As the title 
indicates, the works contrast broadly as essays in systematic 
philosophy based in theory of knowledge (or the Kantian theoretical 
philosophy) and in practical philosophy (or Kantian “metaphysics of 
morals”). 
 
We shall argue that Fichte’s project of illuminating the stance of 
human agency and his frank appeal to the immediacy of individual 
self-hood is currently philosophically more compelling than the 
systematization of human cognition that Schelling achieves in 
abstraction from the lived subjectivity of the individual human agent, 
partly in casting purposes ahead of herself, partly in obedience to the 
moral “summons” symbolized by the presence of other embodied 
agents. 
 
Fichte’s departure from Jena in June 1799 in the wake of the 
“Atheism Controversy” disrupted the forces of transcendental idealism 
which for a decade had been concentrated in that small university 
town,4 and after Jacobi publicly denounced the Wissenschaftslehre as 
nihilism5 and Kant publicly disavowed its connection with 
transcendental idealism,6 plans with various publishers that involved 
both the idealist philosophers and the thinker-critics of the romantic 
circle were quickly hatched. Critical philosophy needed to show a 
united face and catch the edge of the cultural currents swirling in the 
times just before the turn of the century. A bewildering variety of 
these plans are documented in the letters that passed between  
Fichte in Berlin and Schelling in Jena in 1800, as well as political 
schemes (and personal affronts) over who was to lead the new 
institute and who was to review new developments in the sciences and 
the arts. 
 
But the Fichte-Schelling Correspondence broaches difficult 
philosophical tensions as well, hidden under the courtesies of 
exchanging copies of publications and asking for opinions of newly 
published works. Schelling ordered his publisher to send Fichte a 
vellum copy of the System of Transcendental Idealism when it was 
published in the spring of 1800, but it did not arrive until November 15 
(FSB, 105). Four days later, Schelling received a copy of The Vocation 
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of Man (FSB, 113). Fichte made a few pages of notes on Schelling’s 
system7 and began to get quite actively engaged in a debate with its 
author on the place of a philosophy of nature within idealism. Schelling 
does not explicitly refer to the Vocation for a nearly a year, and then 
his sole remark on the essay is to disparage the way it ultimately 
relocated the ground of consciousness beyond the reach of philosophy, 
in the realm of faith: there is simply no room for faith in philosophy 
(FSB, 135). The polite exchange of copies, otherwise the sign of 
friendship, really was the drawing of battle lines: one version of 
idealism could not see there was much for idealism to do with nature—
except to move away from it; another found no sense in locating the 
topic of discussion far beyond what theoretical intellect could make of 
the deliverances of the sense. 
 
Faith, Interest, and the “Intellectual World” 
 
Because Fichte’s disavows any systematic or “scientific” intent 
for The Vocation of Man and hopes to work from the standpoint of 
natural consciousness in a personal and rhetorical way, it is difficult to 
discern the three-part structure of the argument before it unfolds and 
to precisely locate the new terminology of “faith,” “interest,” and the 
“supernatural” (überirdische) or “intellectual” world. 
 
Let us first consider the terminology of the third book. Fichte’s 
argument moves within a broad context of phenomena that we can 
together call interest. In the most basic cases, biologically embedded 
human needs such as hunger, hydration, human company, shelter 
against the elements, and security against predators (animal or 
human) are best met, not dismissed skeptically. Hunger commands, 
and the same can be said for social needs such as the rearing of 
children and the protection of the infirm and aged. Fichte’s argument 
moves freely among these affectively announced imperatives, and the 
fluidity of such reference reminds the reader that human action has 
the structure of bidding or command. 
 
Confronted with the problem of skepticism’s challenge to the 
validity of the “natural urge” to take one’s presentations as caused by 
external objects to which they refer, Fichte argues that it is not an 
arbitrary decision whether to treat one’s feeling and presentations as 
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merely one’s states of consciousness or whether to accord them a 
reality—even if theoretical philosophy (epistemology) is totally unable 
to provide a satisfactory account of the presumed causal link between 
“outside” and “inside.” Because one is primarily an actor or an agent 
embedded in a situation, the standpoint of ordinary consciousness 
inclines toward a “practical realism”: “If we all have the ability and 
urge to go beyond our first natural view, then why do so few go 
beyond it...? It is not reasons, for there are none that can do it. Rather 
it is their interest in a reality they want to produce—the good person 
simply to produce it; the common sensuous person to enjoy it” (VM, 
73; BM, 258–59). 
 
The standpoint of activity is native to human consciousness—
and my word native implies that in one sense it is found, or comes 
along with the situated or intentional aspect of consciousness, and in 
another sense that, once consciousness has been socially developed or 
educated, it is voluntarily adopted and exercised both for its own sake 
and for the consequences that action brings. Natural—by which Fichte 
means practical, not theoretical—consciousness is interested or 
inclined. It is driven by natural urges and finds itself confronted with 
concepts that are not mere pictures, but which prompt an independent 
activity that realizes them. Interest begets purposes and human 
consciousness is naturally purposive, thinks Fichte. This urge to realize 
one’s purposes through action points to an ultimate situation where 
consciousness becomes independent, self-active and self-realizing.  
This urge, which is felt or experienced, not conceived, connects me to 
a represented situation which is the aim or goal of my activity. “I think 
this real power to act, but I do not think it up. The immediate feeling 
of my drive to independent activity is behind this thought. Thought 
does nothing more than represent this feeling and take it up into its 
own form, the form of thought” (VM, 69; BM, 255). 
 
The familiar stance of deontological ethics:  Ought implies can, 
points to the wider situation of human agency. That I am impelled by a 
natural drive, inclined by a personal or social goal, and inspired or 
commanded by an ideal somehow beyond my immediate well-being 
implies there is a natural bridge between interest, faith, and the 
mobilization of specific activity or will. “No one who is alive can part 
with this interest nor with the faith which this interest brings with it. 
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We are all born in faith. Whoever is blind in this regard will blindly 
follow its secret and irresistible prompting. Whoever can see will follow 
with open eyes, and will believe because he wants to believe” (VM, 73; 
BM, 259). 
 
The third book of the discussion introduces faith as the 
antithesis of the disheartenment and doubt produced by the skeptical 
probing of first realistic, then idealistic constructs of epistemology.8 
So a first sense of “faith” is the renewed sense of self and the validity 
of action that the switch from the theoretical to the practical stance 
effects. “[I]t is not these [empty images of things supposedly existing 
outside ourselves] but the necessary belief in our freedom and 
strength, in the reality of our acting. . . that justifies all consciousness 
of a reality existing outside of us—a consciousness which itself is only 
a faith since it is based on faith, but a faith that necessarily follows 
from consciousness” (VM, 79; BM, 264). A second sense of ‘faith’ is 
belief in the efficacy of rational action creating not only a better, but a 
utopian world: “[T]hat purpose has got to be achieved. Oh, it is 
achievable in life and through life, for reason commands me to live.  
It is achievable, for—I am” (VM, 91; BM, 276). 
 
Only in the third and fourth sections of the third book does 
“faith” take on any connotation of a belief that is not directly 
supported by reason. The third part deploys a transcendental 
argument, based on the Kantian presupposition that purposive 
behavior or agency is not the mere production of worldly 
consequences, but aims at efficacy in a purely rational order—or the 
cultivation of will for sake of will. Impulse, interest, and purpose are all 
gradations of rational activity that culminate in morality, or obedience 
to the command of reason. On this point, we note that the Kantian 
cannot refute a utilitarian or neo-Darwinian understanding of morality; 
the parties can only disagree. But if the Kantian presupposition is 
granted, then Fichte can argue 
 
1. that obedient (lawful) willing is commanded of me for its own 
sake, 
2. that this demand is the source of everything rational in me, in 
particular my freedom, and 
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3. therefore, it is reasonable to believe in a supersensible, eternal 
world, where the impulse to improve and perfect my existence 
is realized, rather than frustrated (VM, 101; BM, 286–97). 
 
Belief in the efficacy of my will is “faith,” but hardly a Jacobian  
salto mortale—or an invitation to believe twenty-three incredible 
things before breakfast, as one Anglican divine famously said. It is a 
natural belief based on arguable premises. 
 
The fourth part of the discussion, however, moves beyond the 
Kantian religion of morality Fichte previously espoused in his 1798  
On the Basis of Our Belief in a Divine Governance of the World, where 
he argued from the premise: “I myself, along with my necessary goal, 
constitute what is supersensible” (SW V, 181; IWL, 147), to a 
terminological, and effectively nontheistic, if not atheistic, 
identification of God with the moral order: “The living and efficaciously 
acting moral order is itself God. We require no other God, nor can we 
grasp another” (SW V, 186; IWL, 131). In 1800, evidently another 
God is required, even if that principle is not quite conceivable. Fichte 
now speaks of an “infinite will’ that is the union and mediation of all 
finite wills, that perceives each finite will, and of a “God” that is “the 
union and direct interaction of a number of autonomous independent 
wills with each other” (VM, 107–109; BM, 293). This union of wills is 
an open secret that lies before us in this present life, asserts Fichte; it 
does lie before us, unnoticed as Fichte claims, if what is meant is the 
interaction of diverse agents or the making-way for one another that is 
demanded by morality (and to some extent fulfilled in the social and 
legal realms). The involvement of a divine agency is not so plainly 
discernible. 
 
Fichte goes on to ascribe the conventional predicate of “creator” 
to this infinite will, but this deity creates monadologically, “in the only 
way it can be and in which alone a creation is required: in finite 
reason” (VM, 110; BM, 296). This remark is cryptic as it stands; in the  
Correspondence, Fichte speaks more technically of the principle of the 
intellectual world as  
 
an inconceivable real ground of the separation of individuals and 
the ideal link of all of them = God. (This is what I call the 
intelligible world.) This final synthesis is the highest. If you wish 
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to give the name “being,” indeed absolute being, to whatever 
still remains impenetrable to this view, then God is pure being. 
Notwithstanding, in itself this being is not some kind of 
compression, but it is absolute agility, pure transparency, light, 
but not the light that reflects from bodies. It is only the latter 
for finite reason: it is accordingly only a being for finite reason, 
not in itself (FSB, 129).9 
 
Fichte works out this line of speculation at some length in the 
1801–02 Wissenschaftslehre.10 It is, however, only of such 
speculations as are found in the fourth section of the final book of  
Vocation that Schelling’s complaint, voiced late in the Correspondence, 
could apply, to wit, that it relocates the ground of knowing beyond 
knowing (which ought to be an embarrassment for Wissenschaftslehre 
or “Science of Knowing”), that there is as little place for “faith” in 
philosophy as there is in geometry, and that this whole line of 
speculation considerably alters Fichte’s whole philosophy, which 
previously had simply identified “God” and the moral order (FSB, 135). 
 
We are now in a position to approach the question of the overall 
structure of The Vocation of Man. I have approached the work 
backward, starting with the resolution of the dialectical perplexities in 
Book Three in order to avoid unnecessary entanglement in the 
discouraging and/or skeptical epistemological investigations of the first 
two books—a strategy that parallels informed attempts to read Fichte’s  
Grundlage des gesamten Wissenschaftslehre. 
 
At some distance from the text, it is possible to identify Fichte’s 
interlocutors or “targets” in the first two sections.  
 
It is fairly easy to see that the target of Book One, with its 
realistic account of knowledge that highlights the principle of causality 
and which ends by undermining any authentic sense of freedom, is an 
idealized Spinoza. When the analysis of sensation, thought, and action 
ends in an overwhelming causal determinism coming from the outside, 
as it were, the writer laments: “I don’t act at all, but nature acts in 
me. I cannot will the intention of making something of myself other 
than what I am determined to be by nature, for I don’t make myself at 
all, but nature makes me and whatever I become” (VM, 19; BM, 207). 
This is perhaps a reprise of the  crushing sarcasm of the Earth Spirit’s 
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reply to Faust’s übermenschlich pretensions in the opening scene of 
Goethe’s Faust, Part I.11 Or perhaps it is a reflection of Fichte’s worries 
about the direction of Schelling’s Naturphilosophie that get expressed 
repeatedly in the Correspondence. 
 
A second attempt is made in the first book to overcome the 
paralysis of determinism by hypothetically elaborating a “system of 
freedom,” where the wishes of the heart—“I want to love. I want to 
lose myself in taking an interest [Theilname], I want to be glad and be 
sad. For me the highest object of this interest [Theilname] is myself” 
(VM, 24; BM, 212)—are skeptically undercut again by the suspicion 
that this love and “interest” (or self-absorption), so vividly 
experienced, is but itself a product of the forces of nature. Unless 
affect, urge, and drive are connected to a standpoint where genuine 
independence and self-activity are achieved (the moral stance of  
Book Three), passion and interest itself is subject to Spinozistic causal 
dissection as the “miserable worm’s” self-deception. 
 
The target of Book Two is more mysterious. Fichte clearly 
presents a transcendental analysis of cognition, but lacking the anchor 
of “the primacy of the practical” that Kant added to his Transcendental 
Idealism, idealistic epistemology transform the contents of 
consciousness into the stuff of dreams—the line of argument deployed 
against idealism by later anti-Kantians such as Schopenhauer, 
Nietzsche, and Wittgenstein, but used in different form in Fichte’s 
lifetime against Wissenschaftslehre by Reinhold, Schelling, and Hegel: 
the charge that Wisenschaftslehre is mere logic, not philosophy.12 
 
There are three phases of the idealistic analysis of cognition 
presented in Book Two. In the first phase, an inspection of 
consciousness is seen to reveal an essential togetherness of 
self-consciousness and the object of consciousness, but since there is 
no sensation or object of consciousness without self-consciousness, 
the latter is judged to be condition of the former. The object is given in 
self-consciousness, but there is no consciousness of the production of 
the object (VM, 40–41; BM, 228–29). Secondly, in the natural stance 
of theoretical consciousness, the object of consciousness is imputed to 
the workings of an external object upon consciousness, with the 
connection between the two furnished by the principle of causality.  
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But external objects can never be observed in their “externality,” nor 
is causality directly experienced. Both the supposedly external object 
and the linking causal relation are thought, and what one is conscious 
of is not the so-called external object, but the positing of an object 
according to an inner law of thought (VM, 45; BM, 233). The mere 
theoretical idealist concludes, then, that all knowledge is knowledge of 
oneself alone. Finally, the externality of the imputed objected is 
explained through intuition—a projection of an internal state outward 
or an out-seeing that is accompanied by self-consciousness or 
in-seeing (VM, 51; BM, 238). The object is produced in consciousness 
unconsciously or without consciousness of its production through a 
threefold process of intuition, which places the object in one’s 
consciousness as outside of consciousness, thought, which imputes a 
causal relationship between “outside” and “inside,” and a third stage of 
synthesis, which hides the above-mentioned two mechanisms (VM, 
56–57; BM, 244–45). That this march of thought is summarized as: 
the consciousness of the thing outside of us is absolutely nothing more 
than the product of our own presentative capacity (VM, 59; BM, 236), 
leads me to conclude that Reinhold is object of Fichte’s concern in this 
second book. But closer to our concerns here is the similarity of this 
analysis to the dialectic of hidden or unconscious production, 
projection, and eventual entry-into-consciousness that is the motor of 
Schelling’s genetic deduction in the System of Transcendental 
Idealism. It lends weight to Fichte’s charge, repeated often to  
Schelling in the Correspondence (and to others outside of the 
presumed perimeter of confidentiality that the letters adopted) that 
Schelling never understood transcendental idealism.13 
 
The Odyssey of Consciousness 
 
When Schelling turned from his explorations of the possibility of 
an idealistic philosophy of nature in the years 1797 to 1799 and 
attempted a grand work of consolidation, he actually believed that 
philosophy had two independent parts, transcendental philosophy and 
natural philosophy, each of which functioned adequately on its own, 
but together calling for the unification of a “grand theory.” The first 
thing Fichte notices when he reads the 1800 System of Transcendental 
Idealism, arguably Schelling’s most polished piece of reasoning, is that 
its two major parts do not fit together or, much worse, that unification 
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of nature and consciousness is achieved solely on naturalistic grounds: 
“His classification of philosophy into two fundamental sciences.—I 
assert: nature as object is only thought by you: it only exists to the 
extent that you think it.”14 Fichte has good reason to be worried, for 
the public perceived the two philosophers to hold a roughly common 
position, and the frankly abstractive, conceptual methodology of the 
system, articulated with little reference to the I’s standpoint of agility,  
self-activity or self-constitution—now cryptically referred to by Fichte 
as a Grundreflex—ignored the most fundamental aspect of 
Wissenschaftslehre, that I know when I know, and thus tended to 
perpetuate the fundamental misreading of transcendental idealism that 
the provisional 1794–95 Grundlage des gesamtem Wissenschaftslhre 
seemed to invite, namely, that it was all about some ghostly 
disembodied absolute I that subsisted outside personal consciousness. 
Argues Fichte (in his personal notes): “If we only knew (about objects) 
without knowing in turn that we know them, then transcendental 
idealism would not be possible at all. And (knowingly) this standpoint 
is the standpoint of the philosophy of nature; unknowingly, it is the 
standpoint of dogmatism.”15 
 
It is beyond the scope of this chapter to fully explore the  
System of Transcendental Idealism; our discussion will be limited to: 
(1) its starting point and methodology; (2) the way it embeds the 
genetic account of intelligence in the stages of nature’s development; 
and (3) the way its only approach to an account of “spirit” or 
embodied consciousness is an objectified one, painted on the large 
canvases of social philosophy, philosophy of history, and aesthetic 
creation—rather than the miniature frames Fichte preferred of personal 
morality, life in the historically given state, and religion.16 
 
(1) The most striking feature of Schelling’s method in the  
System is its abstract and Reinholdean cast. Schelling’s knowledge of  
Wissenschaftslehre was limited to its first, quasi-foundational 
presentation in the 1794–95 Grundlage, and to the rather wooden 
analysis of presentation or the basic item of consciousness as a 
synthesis of opposite, a subjective and an objective element. That I 
know when I know, that I am given to myself in self-consciousness, 
and the presentation is originated in my consciousness are features 
that are absent in Schelling’s analysis, or at best underappreciated. 
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While for Fichte in the second Jena system, “intellectual intuition” 
means that the I can at least symbolically access the constitutive or 
active I in reverting upon itself, “intellectual intuition” is for Schelling 
from the very start a mysterious process of abstracting from lived 
subjectivity and only thereby gaining access to the I on its productive 
or constitutive level. 
 
At the natural level, self-consciousness is analogous to the eye:  
“Self-consciousness is the lamp of the whole system of knowledge, but 
it casts its light ahead only, not behind” (SI, 47; Tr., 18). Unable to 
see itself unless it alters the natural situation, the philosopher 
arbitrarily contrives to get self-consciousness to produce itself, in 
laboratory conditions as it were, and in this experiment the I becomes 
an object for itself in the act of producing itself. This implies that. 
 
1. the I is originally an object only for itself, and 
2. in becoming an object for us, it become what it originally is not, 
viz., something objective, and 
3. therefore, its self-production in transcendental philosophy 
essentially involves a self-limitation (SI, 70–71; Tr., 36). 
 
To limit itself, the I must oppose something to itself, and this 
opens up a series of dialectical moves whereby the I appears to itself 
(and the philosopher-experimenters in attendance) as finite in its 
infinitude, objective in its subjectivity, limited in its limitlessness, and 
so forth. Having induced that which is absolutely nonobjective to 
become objective, self-consciousness enters into a permanent duality 
of acting and intuiting, or producing and reflecting. “Through this 
constant double activity of producing and intuiting, something is to 
become an object, which is otherwise not reflected by anything at all” 
(SI, 41; Tr., 13). In its limited and genetically exhibited form, the I 
seems to be in perpetual duplicity, first a producing, then a 
subsequent intuiting; this is the price one must pay for having the 
essentially nonobjective projected onto the objective, or that which is 
essentially self-intuition (or intellectual intuition) become visible to 
finite subjects. But the in-itself character of the I, that it is free and 
self-originating, is that it is intellectual intuition (SI, 58–59; Tr., 27); 
only the whole series of finite forms of consciousness, produced in the 
incessant shuffling from production to intuition in a specific form, then 
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back to production again, approximates the I in itself. The I is 
essentially not a thing, but philosophy performs the trick of turning it 
into a thing by generating the series of all possible kinds of things, all 
possible forms of objectivity. 
 
(2) The elaboration of the philosophy of nature is the  
System’s most ingenious and most technical feature, for the lopsided 
dialectical back and forth between productivity and product (intuition) 
enables Schelling to parallel the deduction of the phases of intelligence 
with the articulation of the successive levels (Potenzen) of nature. 
Schelling’s most illuminating comments about the relationship between 
transcendental idealism and the philosophy of nature can be found in 
the latter half of the 1800 General Deduction of the Dynamic Process.  
A basic point that needs to be appreciated by post-Darwinian readers 
is that nature traverses the ladder of its successive stages 
speculatively, or in philosophical reflection, not actually or historically, 
and the same holds for the corresponding phases of intelligence.  
All phases of nature coexist simultaneously, as do all moments of 
intelligence—sensation or qualities, intuition, and the various forms of 
understanding.17 Both the major parts of transcendental idealism, 
philosophy of nature and transcendental philosopher proper, are 
exercises in Platonic anamnesis, as it were—philosophical recoveries or 
“recollections” of the ideas of nature and intelligence. The one 
philosophizing finds his or her self-consciousness already existing in 
the highest potency, but a flatfooted idealism that straightaway makes 
reason the sole intention of nature is mistaken in this anthropomorphic 
line of thought, for it is only in putting aside subjectivity and learning 
to think objectively or purely theoretically that the philosopher can 
effect this philosophical recovery—just as in done in the System of 
Transcendental Idealism (DP, § 63, 164). In this process, however, the 
so-called dead nature of Newtonian physics disappears, and nature’s 
observed qualities are seen to be sensations, its “matters” or corporeal 
bodies intuitions, and organic nature as itself intelligence (DP, § 63, 
164–65). 
 
There are three general phases or epochs in the System’s 
construction of nature-or-intelligence: (1) from original sensation to 
productive intuition, (2) from productive intuition to reflection, and (3) 
from reflection to the act of will. The first epoch is emblematic of the 
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whole deduction. The I limits itself or objectifies itself in order to 
appear in consciousness; its self-construction is, for the observer, a 
transition to duality, from pure subject to subject-and-object (SI, 93; 
Tr., 51). This happens by means of the I’s positing a limitation, which 
limitation, however, since it is a spontaneous act of the I, is the 
establishment of a boundary that is not a boundary, or an activity on 
both sides of the boundary. The I appears to itself as limited or 
determined in sensation, which in reality is nothing but the sensing 
itself. “Now if the I always senses only its own suspended activity, the 
sensed is nothing distinct from the I, a fact to which ordinary 
philosophical parlance has already given expression, in that it speaks 
of the sensed as something purely subjective” (SI, 98; Tr., 56).18 The I 
does not just have sensations, however, but has sensations of bodies 
or things. This occurs because its intuition (sensation) is accompanied 
by an intuition of intuition; the sensation becomes the matter of 
“productive intuition,” and the I’s object becomes matter (SI, 121; Tr., 
72). This productive activity, in turn, appears to the I as two activities, 
one imaging and one producing; their union or synthesis, that which 
appears to consciousness, is the awareness of matter and mind: “In 
the first epoch of self-consciousness we could distinguish three acts, 
and these seem to reappear in the three forces of matter and in the 
three stages of its construction. These…give us three dimensions of 
matter, and these latter, three levels in the dynamic process [gravity, 
magnetism, and electricity]” (SI, 146; Tr., 90). The two subsequent 
epochs of theoretical philosophy have a more idealistic cast, the 
second being the elaboration of the forms of thought (Kant’s 
categories), and the third the forms of relation (schematism) and 
judgment. Theoretical philosophy culminates in the uncovering of 
“transcendental abstraction,” the activity whereby space, time, the 
putative relations of substance and causality that link discrete bodies, 
and so forth, are all separated out in experience and become capable 
of philosophical (transcendental) analysis for the philosopher who 
observes the process of evolution that empirical abstraction has 
facilitated (SI, 223; Tr., 149–50). By the same token, the freedom of 
transcendental abstraction allows those observing consciousness to 
transit to the order of practical reason or will, where the active 
character of the original I first becomes apparent to itself. 
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(3) Because Schelling believed that intellectual intuition, both in 
the original I and in the philosopher-observer recovering its activity in 
philosophical reflection, involves surrender of subjectivity or moving to 
an impersonal point of view, the System’s practical philosophy takes 
an objective (or collective) approach to the life of the mind and largely 
leaves the individual agent behind. In this, it prefigures Schelling’s 
so-called system of identity and Hegel’s “objective idealism.” The 
author warns the reader at the start that what is at issue in this 
section is not a peculiar moral philosophy commended to any singular 
agent, but a transcendental reflection on the thinkability of moral 
concepts as such, conducted at the highest level of generality (SI,  
230; Tr., 155). 
 
The practical point of view entails an “absolute abstraction” from 
the previous series of acts and the phenomena they produced, for 
while theoretical consciousness is always involved with objectivity and 
necessarily takes the shape of subject-objectivity, practical 
consciousness or will demands pure self-determination—activity that is 
only involved with objectivity to the extent that future or 
not-yet-existent states are conceived which the will strives to realize. 
That I can act at all (here Schelling is quite in concurrence with Fichte) 
means that I am not necessitated to act in any specific way by any 
worldly state or situation, or that, to some extent, I am free to act as I 
choose or will. In theoretical philosophy, the I’s productivity remained 
hidden from itself; it could intuit itself as produced, as an organic 
body, for instance, but the I could never there achieve self-intuition. 
Only in willing is the I raised to a higher power and enabled to intuit its 
essential activity (SI, 231–32; Tr., 156). Thus, the autonomy that 
Kant places at the summit of moral philosophy is seen to be the 
principle of all transcendental idealism (SI, 233; Tr., 157). 
 
From these, its opening moves, it is easy to see how the 
practical part of the System of Transcendental Idealism unfolds, 
namely, along familiar Kantian and Fichtean lines that prize the 
autonomy of the individual inside a context of plural agents mutually 
respecting one another’s freedom, the drift of history to replace 
hegemony and the tyranny of traditionally favored individuals, 
genders, and ethnicities with egalitarian or cosmopolitan societies, and 
the fostering of intellectual disciplines where teleological ideas or 
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forecasts lead the progress of science, not just masses of 
contingencies and discrete observations. Schelling introduces a novel 
point in making the exercise of will the I’s entry into time, the moment 
of absolute abstraction, or the separation of inner sense from outer; 
only when the I acts is it for itself, and only when it is for itself in a 
situation of ever-changing and lapsing actuality is it called upon to act 
concretely (SI, 231; Tr., 155–56). He follows Fichte’s social and legal 
philosophy of the late Jena years in making the confrontation of my 
will with the wills of other embodied subjects in a social-legal setting 
the real factical “check” that individualizes my consciousness and 
concretely locates a sphere of activity for me here and now. The Other 
is the limit of my freedom not only in a general or moral sense; the 
pressure of other wills determines my situation and in fact 
individualizes my activity; unless I were hemmed in by other wills, my 
sphere of activity would be infinite and embrace all possibility. Only 
the specific situation of other agents acting against my will gives my 
will a specific object (SI, 244–45; Tr., 166). 
 
The real novelty of the 1800 System comes in its final section, 
where the absolute self-activity of the practical stance is merged with 
the blind productivity of the theoretical in a consideration of aesthetic 
creativity and the way the produced work of art displays an infinity of 
meaning. Presumably, Schelling benefited from discussions with the 
Jena romantics in this regard, although the general outline of his 
treatment is inherited from Kant. What is new and surprising in 
Schelling’s treatment is the emphasis on the work, not the creator’s 
intent or state of mind. If one considers the artist’s freedom, then 
every work of art is the one absolute work, for the work indefinitely 
conveys endless meanings and thus succeeds in doing what nature 
cannot do—displaying the infinite activity of the I (SI, 327; Tr., 231). 
This is a fruitful, almost contemporary approach to aesthetics, since it 
frees artistic creativity from any fetters of conventional or traditional 
forms, makes utterly no judgments about how nature and its stuff is 
imbued with human meaning in a particular work or form of art, and 
points to an essential feature that differentiates the aesthetic work 
from the utilitarian or “craft” object—a surplus of meaning due to an 
overdetermination of the determinate (in Schelling’s language, a 
display of the infinite within the finite). In the work of art, the absolute 
activity of the practical perspective is merged with the 
NOT THE PUBLISHED VERSION; this is the author’s final, peer-reviewed manuscript. The published version may be 
accessed by following the link in the citation at the bottom of the page. 
Fichte’s Vocation of Man, Chapter 15 (2013): pg. 255-272. Publisher's Link. This article is © SUNY Press and permission 
has been granted for this version to appear in e-Publications@Marquette. SUNY Press does not grant permission for this 
article to be further copied/distributed or hosted elsewhere without the express permission from SUNY Press. 
16 
 
productive-but-hidden character of theoretical or object-producing 
consciousness, and the whole aspect of productivity is concretized for 
intuition—a necessarily polyvalent intuition wherein many subjects will 
sense and understand many different things. Art is the display of 
nature’s I: 
 
What we speak of as nature is a poem lying pent in a 
mysterious and wonderful script. Yet the riddle could reveal 
itself, were we to recognize in it the odyssey of the spirit, which, 
marvelously deluded, seeks itself and in seeking flies from itself; 
for through the world of sense there glimmers—as if through 
words, the meaning—as if through dissolving mists the land of 
phantasy for which we search. (SI, 328; Tr., 232)19 
 
The Difference—If Not the Primacy—of the 
Practical 
 
The exchange of texts—our major texts—between Schelling and 
Fichte in November 1800 did not settle matters between the two. The  
Correspondence goes on for another fourteen months with neither 
author quite able to pin-point the “one difference” that separates the 
two, and when the exchange breaks off, the works each writes in 1802 
continue to reflect the abortive private negotiations the letters 
contained. In Bruno, Schelling echoes the judgment of his new 
colleague Hegel that Fichte’s idealism is essentially trapped inside the 
subjective perspective and hence unable to attain the broader 
standpoint of absolute (or “objective”) idealism.20 Fichte’s Darstellung 
des Wissenschaftslehre (1801–02) not only expands the “infinite will” 
of the Vocation of Man or the “pure being” of the letters into a “system 
of the intelligible world,” it contains an extensive critique of Schelling’s 
new system of identity that insists that philosophy must begin in 
freedom to end with freedom, something no “new Spinozism” or 
treatment that begins with mere being can achieve.21 The perplexity 
Fichte encountered when he read the System of Transcendental 
Idealism persists: “Am I more correct in saying what I say, or is he in 
saying what he says? Will we ever comprehend each other?” (LS, 414; 
PRFS 120). 
 
On several scores, the contest between Fichte and Schelling 
must be scored a draw: Each achieves, to a remarkable degree, the 
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ideal of a philosophical system that comprehends at least some of the 
more important phenomena of human existence; the fact that Fichte’s 
ends with a philosophical theology and Schelling’s with an objectivistic 
(product-based) philosophy of art only underlines the difference of 
their starting points. Furthermore, each reasons according to a 
defensible philosophical methodology—Fichte insisting, “No freedom 
[at the top], no ethics [in the end]” (SW II, 150), Schelling that the 
philosopher must abstract from subjectivity and adopt an impersonal 
or objective stance to attain the absolute. 
 
In other respects, Fichte’s line of reasoning is superior to 
Schelling’s: he fully engages with the philosophical currents of 
modernity, from Descartes’s universal doubt to Reinhold’s  
Elementary Philosophy, and is willing to get a consistent system of 
transcendental idealism from Kant’s writings by subordinating his 
reading of the first and third Critiques to the “primacy of the practical” 
announced in the second; Schelling, who can be credited with being no 
mere child of his time, is in some way not a “modern,” for he is quite 
willing to read Plato through the lens of Kant and Kant through the 
eyes of Plato. It is to Fichte’s advantage that the Vocation advances its 
moral theology in the light of an essentially skeptical critique of the 
prospects of any defensible theory of cognition, whether realistic 
(Spinoza) or critical (Kant/Reinhold). Further, the immediacy of the 
moral or agent perspective that Fichte adopts and its resistance to 
being explained or explained away, give him a prima facie advantage—
I can act if I think I can act, but if I am hobbled by a Rube Goldberg 
account of cognition (Kant’s first critique) or neo-Darwinian 
explanation of the ethical, I will have to wonder if I can act when I 
want to act. 
 
Who or what is to decide the issue? As recently as Wilfred 
Sellars’s “Philosophy and the Scientific Image of Man,” the problem 
was deemed insoluble—there is simply no deciding between the 
cognitive stance (secured in and by empirical science) and the 
manifest image (the human as actor and bearer of social and moral 
responsibility).22 Yet technology proceeds on the inverse maxim of 
morality: if the latter announces, “Ought implies can,” the former is 
guided by “Can implies ought.” If in fact technologies of neurological or 
genetic intervention succeed in realizing the clumsy totalitarian goal of 
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re-educating political and social “deviants” to “correct views” and 
social conformity, what is to prevent the practical perspective from 
atrophying and losing its self-claimed unique status in the human 
person as the sole determiner of “good” acts or acceptable behavior. 
Perhaps this is but a fanciful flight to an as yet unrealized and wholly 
unrealizable future, but if we are in the long run biologically and 
ecologically crafted to succeed (continue) rather than to sprout the 
Kantian “holy will,” what will happen when the “moral compass” 
becomes a museum piece like the astrolabe or magnetic compass? 
Though I am personally horrified at the prospect of having to 
surrender my driver’s license because of failing eyesight, faulty 
judgment, and generally slowed synaptic response, the day of 
governance by microchip is at hand. At this writing, automobiles are 
being readied for the market that depend on circuitry and global 
positioning systems to transport all of us far more safely and efficiently 
than the confluence of individual agents’ fallible but “free” decisions—
now seen to result sometimes in five-day traffic jams. 
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